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Abstract. Following the financial crisis effects, the issue of debt 
sustainability became of global importance, even for international 
security reasons. In the EU, despite post-crisis fiscal austerity 
measures aimed at rebalancing the public finances, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio continued to deteriorate. At international level, few countries 
have legislative mechanisms able to contain the public debt increase. 
The case of Argentina, pushed into default because of a single 
uncommon US court decision raised other questions related to the 
status of sovereign debt. It seems that only by agreeing a multilateral 
legal framework under UN umbrella the sovereign debt restructuring 
issues could be addressed.   
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1.  Introduction  
 
The world experience has shown that no particular public debt 
level should be considered, a priori, as being sustainable, the 
scientists and decision makers failing to reach a consensus regarding 
the fundamentals of a certain debt-to-GDP ratio, able to ensure 
favorable prerequisites for both financial stability and economic 
growth. 
The global crisis effects have further complicated the issue of 
public debt sustainability, bringing to light the implications of other 
major drivers. On the one hand, it proved that advanced countries are 
not spared in front of sovereign payment default and cross-border 
contagion risks (the case of Greece, a member of Euro Area). On the 
other hand, weaknesses of financial markets mechanisms and 
regulations facing with severe crisis impacts and adverse shocks on 
sovereign resilience have been observed. 
Overall, it became clear that a crisis of global proportions can 
trigger, in a very short time and without warning, even deriving from 
a single secondary capital market failure by spillover effects through 
worldwide interconnected financial channels, trapping the global 
economy and overtaking its leaders totally unprepared. Furthermore, 
it was enough that only a few top management bankers, incompetent 
or led by greed, to take bad decisions that the entire global financial 
system to fall into chaos. 
In the absence of substantive recovery solutions, under pressure 
and emergence conditions, the financial crisis burden has been thrown 
from the banking system to the public debt on medium and long term, 
transferring systemic risks to the sovereign level. 
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In many cases, the excessive increase in the public indebtedness 
level has been caused by both external shocks and economic policy 
errors. Among these errors, having multiplying adverse effects, were 
the expansionary budgetary policies, ignoring for years the deepening 
of the financial imbalances and the risk of FDI flows slowing down 
by which these ones were financed, the incapacity to notice the signs 
of the global crisis triggered in the early 2007 in the USA and to 
foresee the potential effects, the lack of reaction to the crisis shock 
and the inability to adopt post-crisis policies and measures capable of 
recovering the economy. 
Following the sovereign debt crisis threat in 2010 and 2011, the 
EU policy dilemma “austerity vs. growth” ended self-dismantled by 
an anemic growth and further increase in debt-to-GDP ratio in most 
Eurozone countries (ABN-AMRO, 2015).  
If general government contingent liabilities (guarantees, 
government liabilities related to PPPs recorded off-balance and those 
of public corporations) are added to the public debt, many EU 
countries, including Germany, fall into a much worse indebtedness 
position (Eurostat, February 2015). 
Looking at the future, the outlook of a sluggish global recovery 
and unpredictable internal or international events may hinder 
macroeconomic rebalancing, missing the financial stability targets 
and having an adverse impact on debt sustainability of many 
countries.  
The recent case of Argentina, downgraded to default by the 
rating agencies in July 2014 despite having the capacity to meet its 
payment obligations and contrary to repayments agreements with 
creditors from other countries, including members of Paris Club 
(2014a, b), highlighted another lesson: due to different clauses and 
treatment of government bonds issues at international level, it may 
happen that foreign judicial systems decide upon the debt repayment 
(or restructuring) terms against a sovereign state as witnessed 
Argentina, pushed into default by a New York federal district court 
decision afterwards one litigation case.   
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2.  The issue of public debt capping 
 
Under the circumstances of the global financial markets 
interconnectedness it became obvious that a debt payment problem of 
a country could trigger financial difficulties to other countries through 
various transmission channels. More than that, sovereign-to-sovereign 
debt effects could occur more likely between countries which hold 
government bonds of/to each other.   
There is no analytical study about how countries manage 
sovereign debt limits at the global level that I’m aware of. However, 
it seems that, more than the simple lack of a comprehensive 
approaching, a lot of confusion regarding the crucial importance for 
all nations of a common approaching of sovereign debt management 
persists.  
At international level, the IMF initiated a debate regarding the 
debt limits policy that has to be applied to all members (IMF, 2013). 
The IMF Directors concluded that establishing a unified debt limits 
framework encompassing all borrowing, regardless of its terms, 
would provide a more solid basis for debt sustainability of Member 
Countries, without significant results by now. The IMF re-launched 
discussions in 2014 on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, but 
the debates and controversies around this proposal stand still (IMF, 
2014a). 
Most countries have no public debt limits and the few what have 
one are raising it if needed. The USA and Denmark have similar 
legislative mechanisms which set ceilings for government borrowing. 
At least in the case of USA, the debt-ceiling crisis and the lawmakers 
disputes are well known, the ceiling suspension ending with the 
automatic reset of ceiling, as happened in 2014 i.e. to 17.2 trillion 
USD, by 512 billion USD higher than the previous year (the fifth 
ceiling increase since August 2011), the public debt outstripping 
100% of GDP.  
Denmark, usually considered as model for how to manage the 
public debt, has doubled the debt ceiling in the post-crisis year 2010 
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(from 1000 billion DKK to 2000 billion DKK) the public debt-to-
GDP standing currently below 50% (Eurostat, January 2015). 
Some countries under regional organizations, as the European 
Union, have a target of keeping the public debt below 60% of GDP, 
but this limit is not binding, being applied, along with other criteria, 
for membership accession, most of EU countries (16 of 28) 
outstripping in fact this threshold.  
Following the European sovereign debt crisis, a stability 
mechanism was established in 2012, supported by financial 
instruments providing loans (sovereign bail-out programs) to the EU 
countries in financial trouble.  
A special comment has to be made for Poland, the single 
European country which has a constitutional limit of 60% set for the 
public debt-to-GDP, and two legal limits set at 50% as warning level 
and a threshold of 55%, which, if crossed, the next budget must start 
to fall. In fact, due to this mechanism, Poland succeeded to return 
from 56.6 debt-to-GDP ratio in Q32013 to 48.6 in Q3 2014 (Eurostat, 
2015). 
Some other countries have set targets that cap the public debt 
based on limiting expenditures to expected revenues adjusted 
according to the state of the business cycle (Switzerland) or on 
limiting the structural deficit (to 0.35% of GDP in Germany, Austria 
having a similar target) or on achieving a net surplus over the 
duration of the business cycle (1% in Sweden, Chile using also this 
type of target).  
In several countries (Sweden, Canada), the Government is 
authorized by the legislative to borrow a fixed amount of money for 
the fiscal year (Austin, 2008, Huffington, 2011). 
Having in view the significant expansion of the public debt in 
recent years, mainly in the post financial crisis period (estimated at 
almost 60 tn USD at the world level in 2014, most of it belonging to 
the advanced economies) one could assert that globally, with few 
exceptions, the tools used for maintaining the public debt under 
control largely missed the target.  
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3. The case of Argentina’s debt default 
 
In the current non regulated sovereign debt situation at 
international level, at least two major facts degenerated and became, 
in my view, totally unreasonable:  
- firstly, if a private debtor is made responsible to repay the due 
debt being chased to the last centime, for huge and 
unsustainable public debts caused, at least partially, by 
governing errors there is no individual or institutional 
responsibility but, beside a sort of sovereign immunity, the 
entire population is held indebted, including the its next 
generations;  
- secondly, if countries encounters payment difficulties, instead of 
helping them, the rating agencies are downgrading them,  
worsening their borrowing conditions/options on international 
capital markets, making the financial situation much more 
difficult and thus, speeding the fall into default;  
In my opinion, when a major risk of country default occurs, an 
immediate and orderly restructuring of the sovereign debt is 
preferable, which is an option not always easy for national authorities 
to make.  
But the prolongation of a state characterized by a debt level 
appreciated as unsustainable (the case of Greece in 2011) generates 
overhang effects, worsening the economic situation, increasing the 
uncertainties regarding the upturn perspectives, exacerbating the 
management difficulties aimed at the recovering of sovereign 
payments capacity and to the restoring of financial stability and of 
market access.  
The crucial aspect of the assessment of a debt restructuring 
success or failure, I think, is whether the country becomes after that, 
able or not to meet the related debt obligations. 
The case of Argentina, even if the timing and modalities of its 
post-defaulted debt restructuring have not been conducted under 
optimal circumstances (two waves of debt swap agreements with 
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bondholders in 2005 and 2010, covering 93% of restructured debt), 
represents a good example of a successful restructuring process.  
Looking into history, as a recent study shows (IMF, 2014c, p. 46) 
among 32 episodes of large sovereign debt restructurings recorded in 
the world during the last three decades, Argentina has been able to 
achieve one of the largest and fastest reductions of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, i.e. of 120.1 pp between 2002 and 2012 (from an initial 165% to 
44.9%, which is 12 pp per year as compared to the median of 6.4 pp 
for all episodes).  
The performing Argentina’s debt restructuring is mainly due to 
the rapid recovering of the economy, able to achieve high GDP 
growth rates (an annual average of around 7% in the period 2003-
2013, one of the highest in the world) proving its resilience under the 
external adverse circumstances and allowing to meet all the payment 
external obligations according to the debt restructuring agreements.  
It is therefore strange that a country that has demonstrated the 
will and the effective financial capacity to respect its sovereign 
commitments to be asked for full payment (plus interests) of 2001 
discounted bonds by a small minority of a 7% holdout creditors who 
refused all deal proposals, guided only to make unfair profits and 
covered by a US court decision, contrary to the options of most 
creditors (including from US), to the inter-creditor equity, to the 
Paris’ Club comparability of treatment principle and, more than 
everything else, in the spirit of good faith effort that should guide the 
sovereign debt restructuring under the context of no international 
regime for countries bankruptcy cases.  
More than that, even the creditworthiness and country risk 
assessment is based on key rating factors as macroeconomic 
performances, economic, institutional and fiscal strength, external 
finances and structural characteristics (political risk), Argentina being 
quite well placed to the most of these variables, following the US 
Lower Court ruling, the rating agencies downgraded the country to 
default (Fitch, 2014, Moody’s, 2014, see also comments by Russo 
and Porzecanski, 2014).  
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This uncommon decision endangers not only Argentina, but it 
makes all other ongoing debt restructuring agreements questionable, 
not mentioning that also the advanced countries, which hold the most 
of the global sovereign debt sooner or later may fall under disruptive 
legal challenges, unless new regulations of international financial and 
debt markets are set. 
In my view, Argentina should undertake some actions in order 
to limit the public debt increase, so as to make their change difficult 
once are set, regardless the government type.  
As a prerequisite, an analytical study of the current public 
indebtedness level would be helpful (debt portfolio breakdown on 
maturity, currency composition, type of creditors, local/central 
government etc.) highlighting the uses and effectiveness of the 
sovereign borrowings, the internal and external financial requirements 
and sources on short, medium and long term including the debt 
service, the current account and budget deficits, the international 
reserves, the financial gap and its coverage. 
Among the actions that Argentina should consider on the debt 
side are:  
- initiating a constitutional amendment that establish a debt limit 
as percentage of GDP and a period to comply with from the 
current level;  
- setting a set of warning level thresholds;  
- avoiding government bond issuance in foreign exchange unless 
a long run exchange rate stability is achieved;  
- forbidding the issuance of government bonds under foreign laws 
or including a pari passu clause (at most a Collective Action 
Clause, mentioning that CAC became mandatory for the Euro 
area government bonds starting with January 2013);  
- total transparency for any new sovereign borrowing, explaining 
its rational, destination, future sources for reimbursement, 
proving also its public interest.  
On the fiscal side, Argentina should have in view:  
- setting budget architecture based on primary surpluses up to 
debt return under control;  
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- limiting the government expenditures (but avoiding public 
investments cuts) and establishing a maneuvering space 
depending on the business cycle;  
- reviewing the fiscal regime in order to make it more attractive 
and predictable for the business environment. 
Of major importance for Argentina seems to be also the 
elaboration of a public debt management strategy for the next years 
(revised annually) and charging an experts’ team (politically 
noninvolved) for the debt management on long term.    
Last but not least, under the circumstances of global 
interdependences, a favorable repositioning of the country within 
international politics both towards global powers (including US and 
UK) and emerging forces (as BRICS), should not be neglected. 
As concerns the hedge funds speculating sovereign (and/or) 
private debt, buying the distressed debt at discounted prices (up to 
95%) and claiming then higher prices for bonds or assets (up to the 
full value, including past due interests) from the debtor with court 
orders, known as vulture funds, they have a predator lending 
behavior, as in the case of the New York based Elliott Management 
Corp. against Argentina (see Hornbeck, 2013; Eavis and Stevenson, 
2014; Moore et al., 2014).  
What can be done not to allow this kind of financial 
speculations on the account of countries sovereign debt? firstly, 
countries themselves have to avoid sovereign bond issuance under 
foreign laws, removing the risk exposure to vulture funds (Olivares-
Caminal1, 2012); secondly, the international financial institutions and 
regulations should monitor the sovereign debt markets, penalizing 
highly speculative transactions which threaten the financial balances, 
at the country, regional and global levels; thirdly, any judicial system 
of individual countries should not allow international litigations to be 
solved by the domestic courts, except for those of bonds issuer.  
As many other countries, the United Kingdom banned 
permanently the use of its courts for vulture funds lawsuits in 2011, 
adding in 2015 that Argentina's interest payments on bonds issued 
under UK law are covered by UK law (Stiglitz and Guzman, 2015).  
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USA initiated a similar legislation in 2009 which has been 
blocked by interested lobbyists, remaining one of the few countries 
that allows vulture funds searching unfair returns through litigation 
with highly indebted countries. When a US court  judges a lawsuit 
initiated from a hedge fund known as a vulture against a sovereign 
country, more weight to the existent legal provisions and rules is 
expected as concerns prohibiting fraud and manipulation, complying 
with disclosure requirements, keeping proper business conduct and 
practices.  
 
4. International debate on sovereign debt restructuring 
 
Due to high interconnectedness of international financial 
markets and the increasing risk of crisis contagion effects widespread 
by different transmission channels, the sovereign debt issue became 
of crucial importance for maintaining the global financial stability.  
Along with the public debt limiting issue at national level and 
learning from the sovereign debt crisis triggered in the Euro area in 
2009-2010, i.e. the bail-out of the private banking sector by public 
funds, the international debate around the financial system regulation 
should include, as a priority, finding a consensus regarding the status 
of sovereign debt in order to avoid the payments default at the state 
level or to take internationally accepted legal actions for addressing 
situations like sovereign insolvency.  
The debate should start with clearly (re)defining basic concepts 
regarding the matter of sovereign debt as jurisdiction, accountability, 
enforceability, warning levels and ceilings, government bonds issues 
under national/foreign laws, budget deficit and primary balance, 
sovereign credit rating, sovereign default, contagion effects etc. and 
the related unitary procedures/methodologies for 
enforcement/assessment.  
Obviously, while hoping that international debates arrives at 
global solutions, despite divergent interests and lobbying battles, 
countries should try to find the more adequate tools for managing 
debt, adjusted to their particular situation. 
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The Resolution 68/304 of UN General Assembly (September, 
2014) on sovereign debt restructuring towards the establishment of a 
multilateral legal framework, introduced by the Group of 77 
developing countries and China, at the initiative of Argentina, has 
been approved with more than two-thirds majority, emphasizing the 
importance of the question, including for maintenance of international 
economic security and revealing its global dimension.  
In my opinion, at the core of the reasons statement of UN 
resolution stays the determination of real payment capacity as basis 
for debt sustainability assessment and restructuring, that is, just what 
has not been considered when rating agencies downgraded Argentina 
to default in July 2014, following a hazardous US court ruling.  
One of the main reasons explaining the need to create a legal 
framework that facilitate an orderly restructuring of sovereign debts is 
preventing vulture funds from speculative benefits via litigations 
against indebted countries, as happened in the recent case of 
Argentina, contrary to the spirit of good faith and cooperation that 
should conduct the negotiations towards reaching a consensual 
agreement.  
Obviously, in order to increase the efficiency, stability and 
predictability of the international financial system, in line also with 
the national priorities for achieving a sustainable development, 
defining the modalities for intergovernmental negotiations and the 
adoption of the text of multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring processes, as decided the UN resolution, represents an 
essential step and an urgent need (Stiglitz and Guzman, 2015).  
Going forward, in my view, a clear schedule aimed to a global 
agreement under UN umbrella, as the most representative and 
democratic world forum, on international financial regulatory reform, 
including for sovereign debt restructuring should be set, involving the 
international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, BIS), as 
watchdogs for the appropriate and coordinated functioning of the 
resolution systems and the global mechanism at all layers (national, 
sub-regional, regional).  
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Taking into account the principle of sovereign right of any State 
to restructure its sovereign debt, which should not be impeded by any 
measure emanating from another State, in line with the UN 
resolution, the recent bill passed by the Argentina’s Congress allows 
the country to make payments locally or in jurisdictions beyond the 
reach of the US courts decisions (Reuters, 2014). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
According to the post-crisis approach of sovereign risk at 
international level, the assessment of public debt sustainability should 
focuses more on national issues, such as the ability to generate 
primary surpluses of the budgetary balance, the capacity of 
compliance with the debt service, the prospects for economic growth 
and for the taxation level, the costs of deficit financing on 
international capital markets, the health of the banking system, the 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
In my opinion, the major lesson to be learned after the global 
crisis is that each nation must ensure, in its own way, the solidity of 
the internal and external financial framework, a strong competitive 
economy, a public sector performing management, with a functional 
market economy and with a transparent and efficient business 
environment. 
Generally speaking, it is known that the public debt 
sustainability on long term is conditioned by keeping its growth rate 
below the GDP growth rate, avoiding, at all costs, the debt rollover. 
In other words, following an appropriate allocation, the borrowed 
funds have to finance investment projects that contribute to the 
economic growth in terms of productivity gains or generate higher 
value added, if not on short term, on medium and long run.  
In the case of Argentina, I think the main factor of 
macroeconomic and financial recovery is represented by achieving a 
primary balance surplus as a prerequisite of the debt burden 
reduction, as well as of its costs.  
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In order to avoid economic policy errors, as a main priority of 
debt management, the government of Argentina should change its 
vision from the electoral mandate on short term to the one defending 
the public interests and the intergenerational equity on long run and, 
at the same time, to adopt a more realistic approach of external 
positioning in relation with the global powers axis.   
Among factors which can contribute to the increase in the 
public debt sustainability in Argentina are the revision of 
methodologies and statistics in the public debt field, the more 
transparency of reports concerning public debt management, 
including the commitments for new sovereign borrowings, the 
implementation of public debt management strategies based on real 
internal and international environment assessment, predicting 
essential measures aimed to reduce the debt burden, imposing 
sustainability standards specific to the country and ensuring the 
consistency of guiding lines (ceilings), respectively targets of risk 
exposures, setting strict limits for government bonds issues for 
refinancing the public debt and the reduction, in this way, of the gross 
financing needs, optimizing debt portfolio and putting under control 
the refinancing, the interest rate and the currency risks based on 
appropriate risk management in the particular case of Argentina. 
I think the public debt sustainability depends decisively on the 
economic growth sustainability, so that Argentina should focus on the 
real economy development, capitalizing its natural resources and 
comparative advantages in terms of competitiveness gains which are 
supposed to consolidate the public finances, easing the debt burden 
too.  
Aiming at recovering the global financial balance, all countries, 
including Argentina, regardless the development level, have to build a 
protective shield against the default risk, based on same principles 
and management procedures under a multilateral legal framework on 
sovereign debt restructuring. 
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